A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations by Compa, Lance A & Meyer, Henning
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Research Studies and Reports ILR Collection 
2010 
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations 
Lance A. Compa 
Cornell University, lac24@cornell.edu 
Henning Meyer 
London Metropolitan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Research Studies and Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. 
For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations 
Abstract 
Transatlantic Economic Relations (TER) was neglected by politi¬cians for much of the twentieth century 
as international security issues took priority. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and as economic 
issues have come to prominence TER has assumed increasing importance and yet is largely overlooked 
in academic discussion. This report places TER in its historical context and demonstrates how the 
political agenda and institutional setup are both largely dysfunctional. Viewed through the prism of 
industrial relations and drawing on some real life examples from both sides of the Atlantic, it argues that 
the social dimension is a challenge central to the future development of the relationship and proposes 
institutional innovations which could also be replicated in other areas: for instance in support of 
environmental concerns. Presenting some guiding principles for transatlantic trade, this paper 
recommends the creation of a new secretariat to act as a permanent contact point and providing a variety 
of practical functions essential to making TER work. 
Keywords 
Transatlantic Economic Relations, TER, industrial relations, trade 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Compa, L. & Meyer, H. (2010). A social dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations [Electronic 
version]. London: The Global Policy Institute. 
Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/35/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Reprinted with permission of the Global Policy Institute. 
The Global Policy Institute was created in August 2006 as a Research Institute of London Metropolitan 
University. It brings together academics from the social sciences and business disciplines to analyse the 
dynamics of globalization and formulate policy solutions. The Institute’s research and consultancy will be 
of direct practical use to decisionmakers, policy formation, business users and civil society groups, and it 
will offer partnerships within and beyond the academic community. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/35 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588030
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations     1
Abstract
Transatlantic Economic Relations (TER) was neglected by politi-
cians for much of the twentieth century as international security 
issues took priority. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and as 
economic issues have come to prominence TER has assumed increasing 
importance and yet is largely overlooked in academic discussion. This 
report places TER in its historical context and demonstrates how the 
political agenda and institutional setup are both largely dysfunctional. 
Viewed through the prism of industrial relations and drawing on some 
real life examples from both sides of the Atlantic, it argues that the 
social dimension is a challenge central to the future development of the 
relationship and proposes institutional innovations which could also 
be replicated in other areas: for instance in support of environmental 
concerns. Presenting some guiding principles for transatlantic trade, 
this paper recommends the creation of a new secretariat to act as a 
permanent contact point and providing a variety of practical functions 
essential to making TER work.
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Comprising roughly 800 million 
people, the US and the EU accounted 
for 56.2 per cent of world GDP, 32.2 
per cent of global trade in goods and 
43.7 per cent of trade of services in 
2007 (excluding intra EU 27 trade).3 
Another important economic 
factor is consumption. Although con-
sumption is likely to grow faster in 
the emerging economies in Asia and 
elsewhere, the combined consumer 
demand of the EU and the US will 
remain crucial for the world economy 
in the foreseeable future as many 
emerging economies pursue their 
development with strategies based 
on strong exports into the North 
American and European markets. 
It is this overall imbalance that US 
President Barack Obama sought to 
address during the G20 meeting 
in Pittsburgh encouraging greater 
consumption and lower trade sur-
pluses in the exporting nations of the 
world, led by China (but including 
the likes of Germany), while simulta-
neously promoting more saving and 
reduced deficits in the United States. 
The broad economic indicators 
presented here show the importance 
of the transatlantic marketplace. A 
research report written for the US 
Congress summarized its external 
effects with the conclusion that 
the ‘combined weight of these two 
economic superpowers means that 
how the US and EU manage their 
relationship and the difficult issues 
involving domestic regulations, 
competition policy, and foreign 
investment could well help deter-
mine how the rest of the world 
deals with similar issues’.4 In other 
words, within a weak framework of 
global governance institutions, with 
World Trade Organization (WTO) 
1. The Context of 
Transatlantic Economic 
Relations1 
While transatlantic relations have 
formed an important part of aca-
demic study, Transatlantic Economic 
Relations (TER) are often overlooked. 
Indeed, the attention on respec-
tive responses to the ‘Global War 
on Terror’ has diverted attention 
from other policy fields in which 
the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US) have common 
concerns and interests. Transatlantic 
economic cooperation is one of them. 
      The US and the EU started a 
formal process in the early 1990s 
culminating in the ‘Framework for 
Advancing Transatlantic Economic 
Integration’ (FATEI) in April 2007. 
But this phenomenon has passed by 
largely unnoticed. By way of a back-
ground and introduction to the main 
theme of this paper, which addresses 
the lack of and need for a robust 
social dimension in TER, this section 
seeks to place the transatlantic eco-
nomic relationship in its economic, 
historical and political context. 
Although the political dynamics of 
TER are closely linked to the general 
political climate, the core econom-
ics of the partnership are not. As 
Andrews et. al. have argued, there 
is no evidence that political frictions 
in the fields of security and foreign 
policy have had any significant 
impact on the volume of transatlan-
tic trade and investment.2 Perhaps 
this economic stability is due to the 
characteristics and sheer size of the 
transatlantic marketplace. After all, 
the transatlantic economic partner-
ship is the biggest and possibly the 
most important one in the world. 
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The ‘Transatlantic Declaration’ 
(TD) of 1990 was the first official 
agreement in the new era of trans-
atlantic relations after the Cold War. 
It was largely a statement of shared 
values, emphasizing that the US and 
the EU are ‘mindful of their common 
heritage and of their close historical, 
political, economic and cultural ties’ 
and ‘recogniz[e] that the transatlantic 
solidarity has been essential for the 
preservation of peace and freedom 
and for the development of free and 
prosperous economies as well as for 
the recent developments which have 
restored unity in Europe’.6 The TD 
also laid the foundation for the insti-
tutionalization of the transatlantic 
partnership. It created intergovern-
mental institutions by establishing:
• bi-annual consultations to be 
arranged in the United States 
and in Europe between, on 
the one side, the President 
of the European Council and 
President of the EU Commis-
sion, and on the other side, the 
President of the United States; 
• bi-annual consultations 
between the European Union 
Foreign Ministers, with the 
talks often unsuccessful or dead-
locked, the transatlantic relationship 
has the potential to set the rules 
for international economic activi-
ties using the two blocs’ combined 
powers as biggest producers and 
consumers of goods and services in 
the world. Therefore the way this 
bilateral economic relationship is 
constructed is of crucial importance.
2. From Security to 
Economic Cooperation 
and Institutionalization: 
The Historical Context
TER also has an important historical 
dimension. While the roots of trans-
atlantic cooperation can be traced 
back to the early 20th century, it was 
first put into the political spotlight 
with John F. Kennedy’s ‘Declaration 
of Interdependence’ in the 1960s. 
In a speech in Philadelphia on 4th 
July 1962, the President stated ‘that 
the United States will be ready for 
a Declaration of Interdependence, 
[and] that [the US] will be prepared 
to discuss with a united Europe 
the ways and means of forming 
a concrete Atlantic partnership, a 
mutually beneficial partnership 
between the new union now emerg-
ing in Europe and the old American 
Union founded… 175 years ago.’5 
The transatlantic partnership 
before 1990 was predominately 
motivated by the Cold War and the 
shared security interests of the US 
and Western Europe. When the Soviet 
Empire collapsed, the cohesive force 
of the common enemy subsided. At 
this point, the relationship previously 
dominated by security issues shifted 
increasingly into the economic field.
 
‘When the Soviet Empire 
collapsed, the cohesive force of 
the common enemy subsided’ 
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field was also much more conflict-
laden than the shared security 
interests during the Cold War. The 
new framework not only brought 
down economic barriers but also 
highlighted differences in regulatory 
regimes and political preferences.
The year 1995 brought a major 
evolution of TER and the insti-
tutionalization of the bilateral 
partnership with the agreement 
of the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ 
(NTA). By signing the NTA, US 
President Bill Clinton, EU Commis-
sion President Jacques Santer and EU 
Council President Felipe Gonzáles 
committed to organized coopera-
tion in four key strategic areas:
• Promoting peace and stability, 
democracy and development 
around the world
• Responding to global challenges
• Contributing to the expan-
sion of world trade and 
closer economic relations
• Building bridges across 
the Atlantic.11
In order to address these priority 
areas effectively, a series of insti-
tutional innovations were created 
in the wake of the NTA. As Mark 
Pollack commented, the ‘establish-
ment of a new and novel institutional 
architecture linking Washington 
and Brussels across a wide range of 
issue-areas, represent[ed] the most 
systematic effort at genuine bilateral 
governance in the history of the 
transatlantic partnership.’12 The NTA 
complemented the intergovernmental 
institutionalization of the TD with 
transgovernmental and transnational 
institutions by creating a variety of 
civil society dialogues to strengthen 
Commission, and the US Sec-
retary of State, alternately on 
either side of the Atlantic; 
• ad hoc consultations between 
the Presidency Foreign Min-
ister or the Troika7 and the 
US Secretary of State; 
• bi-annual consultations between 
the Commission and the US 
Government at Cabinet level;
• briefings, as currently exist, by 
the Presidency to US Repre-
sentatives on European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) meetings 
at the Ministerial level.8
The beginning of a formal insti-
tutionalization of the relationship 
was also necessary as the shift in 
transatlantic relations from security 
to economic issues was not without 
problems. As Barry Eichengreen of 
the University of California at Ber-
keley observed in 1998: ‘Economic 
globalization in the aftermath of 
the cold war may be causing tariffs, 
capital controls, and transport costs 
to decline, but it is also putting firms 
in the United States and Europe 
into closer competition.’9 He con-
cluded that ‘policies on one side of 
the Atlantic – be they central bank 
decisions over the interest rate, 
congressional and parliamentary 
decisions about the budget, or gov-
ernment decisions about competition 
and regulatory policy – are having 
strong repercussions on the other. 
The scope for conflict in such an 
environment is considerable.’10 
The shift from security to eco-
nomic cooperation thus made the 
transatlantic partnership more 
complicated. Not only did the basic 
rationale of the partnership shift 
to a new policy field, but the new 
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commitments. Its main aim is to 
enhance the level of discourse 
between members of the European 
Parliament and the US Congress.15 
3. Structural Dysfunctionality: 
The Political Context
Institutional structures are impor-
tant, but it is the political agenda 
which is vital for successful trans-
atlantic relations. And in terms of 
mission, the main purpose of TER 
has been a narrow focus on trade 
liberalization and de-regulation: 
to bring down tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade and investment. 
This limited political agenda 
had severe consequences for the 
transnational level of the transat-
lantic institutional structure. The 
Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) 
folded after just a few meetings 
because there was simply nothing to 
gain or achieve for the labor move-
ment in the framework of a purely 
free-market political agenda.16 The 
Transatlantic Environmental Dia-
logue (TAED) suffered a similar 
fate. Even the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD), the NTA dialogue 
with the arguably biggest interest 
overlap with the agenda, nearly ‘ran 
aground’ when it seemed increas-
ingly difficult to deliver progress in 
the business community’s interest.17 
Most of the progress in the 1990s 
was made in the area of Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs). 
But as Mark Pollack and Gregory C. 
Schaffer made clear: ‘In the view of 
many participants, the “low-hanging 
fruit” for economic cooperation 
had been picked. Governments 
on both sides now found it dif-
bridge-building across the Atlantic 
and more structured networks of 
lower-level officials. After the NTA, 
the three level structure of transatlan-
tic governance looked as follows:13 
Intergovernmental Level:
• Regular summit meetings between 
the US President and a delega-
tion of EU officials (mostly the 
EU Commission President and 
the rotating Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers plus the High 
Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy)
Transgovernmental Level:
• Transatlantic networks of 
lower-level US and EU officials 
working on foreign policy and 
especially economic issues. 
These networks work largely 
unaffected by the dynamics of 
transatlantic high politics
Transnational Level:
• Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD) – consisting of European 
and American CEOs lobby-
ing for the liberalization of the 
transatlantic marketplace
• Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue 
(TACD) – network of EU and 
US consumer organizations
• Transatlantic Labor Dialogue 
(TALD) – Dialogue of trade unions 
(had only a handful of meetings but 
has not been formally abolished)
• Transatlantic Environmental 
Dialogue (TAED) – Dialogue 
of environmental stakehold-
ers – (ceased to exist in 2001)14 
• Transatlantic Legislator’s Dialogue 
(TLD) – created in 1999 as a formal 
response of the European Parlia-
ment and US Congress to the NTA 
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taken on board in the most recent 
transatlantic economic agreement: the 
‘Framework for Advancing Transat-
lantic Economic Integration’ (FATEI), 
adopted in April 2007. The FATEI 
brought major novelties on the politi-
cal as well as the institutional level.
On the political level, the FATEI 
represented an important shift of 
rationale, stressing the potential 
external effects of the transatlantic 
partnership. It stated that deeper 
transatlantic economic integration 
‘will encourage other countries to 
adopt the transatlantic economic 
model of respect for property rights, 
openness to investment, transpar-
ency and predictability in regulation, 
and the value of free markets’.20 
This new awareness of the 
potential external impact of the trans-
atlantic economic partnership can be 
interpreted as somewhat defensive 
in view of rising economic competi-
tion, especially from China. As a 
report of the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) made clear: ‘Given 
quite similar interests in bolstering 
the multilateral trading system, many 
analysts say that both sides could 
cooperate more in addressing the 
rising challenge posed by China.’21 
The Congressional researchers made 
a fundamentally important point: in 
view of rising economic challenges, 
the economic interests (especially 
external ones) of the EU and US are 
seemingly converging. Although the 
internal problems in the partnership 
remain, the changing external frame-
work might well drive transatlantic 
economic cooperation forward.
The continuing institutionaliza-
tion of the partnership is a further 
driver for closer integration. In this 
area, the FATEI created the most 
ficult to move beyond symbolic 
agreements and rearguard efforts 
at conflict resolution. Enhanced 
cooperation among regulators 
had not prevented new and bitter 
trade disputes from arising.’18 
The very limited effectiveness of 
transatlantic economic cooperation 
led to the EU Commission’s 2004 
report Review of the Framework for 
Relations between the European Union 
and the United States. The report 
highlighted further agenda-setting 
problems, criticizing the tendency of 
TER to become overloaded with too 
many issues in very specific economic 
sectors and as a result failing in prior-
itizing issues of strategic importance. 
The lack of political ownership was 
another problem that was detected by 
the Commission. Without renewed 
political commitment at the highest 
level, the authors of the report feared 
that crucial strategic agenda-setting 
would be impossible.19 Some of the 
report’s recommendations were 
 
‘Although the internal 
problems in the partnership 
remain, the changing external 
framework might well drive 
transatlantic economic 
cooperation forward’ 
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substantial problems associated with 
this process, above all the dysfunc-
tionality of the political agenda and 
the institutional structure as well 
as the lack of political ownership. 
These problems remain unresolved. 
What is needed is a widen-
ing of the institutional structure 
together with a broadening of the 
political agenda to create the gen-
eral ownership TER need in order 
to be successful. The TEC needs to 
address more than tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers. The economics 
of trade and the social dimension of 
trade cannot be delinked. With the 
new administration in Washington 
and the new European Commis-
sion in place there is a window of 
opportunity to reshape TER and 
start working on solving its prob-
lems by including a wider spectrum 
of interests and stakeholders. First 
signs from the Obama administra-
tion have been hopeful. In early 
2009, senior officials from the US 
and the EU started work on a plan 
to reframe and rethink the TEC. 
If it is to develop effectively 
and coherently over the coming 
decade, TER needs a social dimen-
sion with a special focus on labor 
issues to overcome its problems. 
The narrow transatlantic political 
agenda of economic liberalization 
and regulation adjustment towards 
the goal of harmonizing standards 
and increasing competitiveness has 
been part of the wider process of 
economic globalization. And given 
the financial meltdown and subse-
quent recession, it is important that 
outdated ideological assumptions 
are avoided. The reality of economic 
relations is more complicated than 
just free trade. More coherent (and 
high profile transatlantic institution 
to date: the Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC), representing new 
political ownership at the highest 
level. Permanent TEC members are 
currently the European Commission-
ers for External Relations, Trade as 
well as Internal Market and Services. 
The US side is represented by the 
US Secretaries of the Treasury and 
Commerce as well as the US Trade 
Representative.22 The TEC focuses on 
regulatory cooperation in addition 
to deeper integration in the areas of 
intellectual property rights, trade, 
financial markets, innovation and 
technology as well as investment.23
Accepting that ‘the low-hanging 
fruits have been picked’, deeper regu-
latory cooperation has the potential 
to lift the transatlantic economic 
partnership onto a qualitatively new 
level. Similar to what was called 
for in the 2004 Commission report, 
a ‘High Level EU-US Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum’ was established 
to ‘facilitate early warning about 
diverging regulatory approaches’.24 
Policy-makers on both sides of the 
Atlantic are also looking into how 
their impact assessment mechanisms 
can be used to identify potential reg-
ulatory conflicts at an early stage.25
4. The Challenge of a 
Social Dimension
This report has so far analyzed the 
economic, historic and political 
significance of TER and set out its 
potential to become a kind of blue-
print for bilateral economic relations 
in a world that is more and more 
characterized by multipolarity. It 
has, however, also highlighted the 
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 Here are some examples sug-
gesting why the TEC should add a 
social dimension to its work, with 
a special focus on labor issues:
• In December 2005, management 
at a Robert Bosch factory in New 
Richmond, Minnesota told work-
ers who had exercised the right 
to strike that they would be per-
manently replaced unless they 
immediately ended the strike and 
returned to work. Fearful of losing 
their jobs, the workers surren-
dered.26 The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) has ruled that 
the US labor law doctrine allow-
ing the permanent replacement of 
strikers violates workers’ freedom 
of association. The Germany-
based Robert Bosch group has 
publicly endorsed the ILO’s core 
labor standards. But in the US, 
the company paid no attention 
to this international norm.
• In September 2007, management at 
a Kettle Chips factory in Norwich, 
England engaged a US-based anti-
union consulting firm to mount a 
vicious campaign against work-
ers seeking collective bargaining 
representation with the British 
union Unite. The consultants held 
mandatory ‘captive-audience’ 
meetings for workers with anti-
union speeches and videos, and 
trained supervisors to meet with 
workers to warn of possible 
closure, strikes and other fear-
mongering messages.27 Swayed 
by these threats, workers voted 
against union representation.28 
ILO standards, as well as indus-
trial relations guidelines of the 
Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), 
higher) common standards will help 
businesses to prosper and employees 
to enjoy decent work conditions. 
Issues of industrial relations and 
quality of work deserve recogni-
tion on the transatlantic level.
In the following sections of this 
report some of the labor issues in 
transatlantic relations are outlined 
and a series of policy proposals 
developed that could form the core 
of a social dimension for TER. These 
policy proposals are meant to inform 
the rethinking process and present 
solutions to some of the problems 
that hitherto have prevented trans-
atlantic economic cooperation from 
developing its full potential.
5. A Reality Check: On-the-
Ground Stories from the 
Transatlantic Field
Conventional wisdom has it that the 
US and the member states of the EU 
have high wages, extensive social 
protection systems, good labor laws, 
and well-functioning legal systems 
to enforce them. Under this view, 
the transatlantic economic relation-
ship starts with a strong social 
dimension as a default feature.
Such complacency is not war-
ranted by reality. There are severe 
flaws in many areas of labor law 
and labor standards enforcement in 
the transatlantic context. Moreover, 
failing to act on a social dimension 
in transatlantic trade means that no 
signal is sent to the rest of the world 
on its importance in the global trade 
system. If the EU and the US fail to 
build a social dimension into their 
economic relationship, why should 
other countries or regions do so?
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pressure on workers and trade 
unions to lower labor costs and 
collective bargaining protections.32 
• The EU has granted ‘GSP-Plus’ 
beneficiary status to Guatemala – 
giving an EU ‘stamp of approval’ 
for Guatemala’s performance 
on workers’ rights – despite 
widespread and longstand-
ing violations of ILO core labor 
standards, including assassina-
tions of trade union activists, 
discrimination against women 
workers in garment factories, 
and widespread child labor. At 
the same time, the US is review-
ing complaints by trade unions 
and NGOs about such violations, 
and whether Guatemala’s contin-
ued preferential trade treatment 
under the US-Central America 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
should be maintained. The two 
main markets for Guatemalan 
exports are sending conflicting 
signals to the government and 
to employers in that country 
about their compliance with 
international labor standards.
• Both the US and EU member 
states are reviewing the status 
of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) among themselves and 
with developing countries. BITs 
give substantial protections to 
private investors and limit gov-
ernmental powers to regulate 
corporate behavior to protect the 
public interest, including social 
rights and standards. In their 
reviews and reforms of BITs, the 
US and the EU should coordinate 
efforts to build labor standards 
into new formulations.33 
proscribe such management 
interference with workers’ organ-
izing efforts. But Kettle Chips 
management and the US-based 
consulting firm disdained these 
international norms. US-based 
anti-union consultants carried 
out similar campaigns in the UK 
against workers at Amazon UK, 
Virgin Atlantic, Honeywell, GE 
Caledonian, Eaton Corporation, 
Calor Gas, Silberline Ltd, FlyBe, 
Cable & Wireless and others.29 
• In September 2009, manage-
ment at a Boeing Corp. factory 
in Spartanburg, South Carolina 
dangled the prospect of putting 
new production lines into the 
factory after workers voted on 
whether to decertify the union 
as their bargaining agent. But if 
they voted to keep their union, 
the new production would likely 
go to the company’s main plant 
in Seattle, Washington. Already 
tied up in mutual charges with 
Europe’s Airbus consortium over 
government subsidies,30 Boeing’s 
action raised a new form of unfair 
trade practice: de-unionizing to 
gain competitive advantage. With 
the implicit promise of greater 
job security, workers voted to 
surrender bargaining rights.31 
• US-based service contracting firms 
operating in Europe, and coun-
terpart EU-based firms operating 
in the US, are often bidding on 
government contracts and privati-
zation schemes on a basis of lower 
wages, lower benefits, and lower 
labor costs generally. For example, 
US-based United Health has taken 
over many privatized systems and 
services of the UK National Health 
Service (NHS) and put enormous 
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be able to eliminate strategic trade 
policies nor should it attempt to 
do so. With this in mind, the TEC 
should take on the more sophisti-
cated mission to manage transatlantic 
trade relations rather than simply 
pursuing the unachievable goal of 
abolishing all trade barriers. The 
TEC’s trade management mission 
needs to absorb the ideas of social 
justice and human rights marked by 
fundamental principles of fairness.
Labor rights and labor stand-
ards should not become arenas 
for economic competition
TER needs to follow the principles 
of decent work as characterized by 
the ILO. The concept of decent work 
includes ‘fundamental principles 
and rights at work and international 
labor standards; employment and 
income opportunities; social protec-
tion and social security; and social 
dialogue and tripartism.’ Interna-
tional trade, including that between 
the EU and the US, should adhere 
to these basic standards, and should 
not allow individuals or corporations 
to undermine these basic rights.
Apply ‘best practices’ and 
highest applicable stand-
ards in the workplace
In respect of trade and investment 
between the US and the EU, a princi-
ple of applying the highest relevant 
standard should prevail. Multina-
tional firms should maintain a ‘best 
practices’ policy of applying the 
highest standard of industrial rela-
tions and workplace conditions, even 
where the highest standard exceeds 
minimum legal requirements. In the 
case of domestic firms in the US and 
Europe that export to or compete 
6. Guiding Principles for 
Transatlantic Trade
As the biggest and most power-
ful trading blocs on the planet, the 
US and EU are in a position to lead 
the world in promoting the high-
est standards and practices. The 
TEC should face up to the abuses 
outlined above and other challenges 
in the US-EU trading relation-
ship. The social dimension of TER 
should reflect common values and 
common commitments to labor 
rights and labor standards. In the 
US and in the EU member states, 
no multinational firm should be 
permitted to violate such rights 
and standards to seek competitive 
advantage. Where violations occur 
in the context of transatlantic rela-
tions, a corresponding transatlantic 
system of oversight and remediation 
should come into play. TER should 
be guided by a clear set of principles:
Facing up to the reality of managed 
trade, not the myth of free trade
While the promotion of transatlantic 
trade has been good for EU and US 
economic development and should 
continue, ‘free trade’ as an empty 
slogan fails to reflect the reality of 
this and other global economic rela-
tionships. The current trade system 
is a complex system governed by 
states and private actors that can-
not be characterized as either free or 
fair. All countries or regional actors 
manage their trade relationships. 
Through a range of tariff and non-
tariff measures (most recently, in the 
use of government procurement to 
bolster domestic industry), trade is 
always constrained or enabled by 
governments and the TEC will not 
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advantage is artificially created by 
deliberately abusing human rights 
– because workers who try to form 
unions are assassinated or thrown 
in jail, or because women workers, 
ethnic minority workers, or migrant 
workers are systematically victim-
ized by discrimination and abuse, 
or because wages are suppressed 
by deliberate government policy or 
employers’ wage-fixing below levels 
of workers’ productivity – the US and 
the EU should fashion joint policies 
in their GSP systems and in free trade 
agreements to prevent such abuses.
Use public funds to sup-
port high standards
In the government procurement 
system, multinational firms should 
not be encouraged to tender bids 
based on cutting jobs or cutting 
workers’ wages and benefits. They 
should compete on the grounds 
of management competency. 
Existing jobs, wages and benefits 
with one another, industrial relations 
and workplace conditions should 
be relevant considerations in the 
trade relationship. So, for example, 
Boeing should not gain competitive 
advantage on Airbus because Boeing 
breaks trade unions in the US while 
Airbus respects trade union rights 
in Europe. Where a firm derives 
competitive advantage by violating 
basic labor rights and standards at 
the point of production, trade meas-
ures should be permitted to remove 
the advantage at the point of sale.
Prevent competition via failure 
to address global warming
In light of the crisis of global warm-
ing and the need for ‘green jobs’ 
growth, governments and multi-
national companies in the US and 
Europe should collaborate to jointly 
address the problem. They should 
not be allowed to compete by failing 
to take steps against global warm-
ing to gain short-term competitive 
advantage but moreover be encour-
aged and helped to be world leaders 
in the fight against climate change.
Coordinate trade and invest-
ment policies towards third 
countries and markets
The WTO’s ‘enabling clause’ allows 
differential treatment of developing 
countries to enhance their prospects 
for economic growth and develop-
ment through trade with the US 
and the EU. The US and the EU 
should coordinate policies towards 
developing countries. The com-
parative advantage of low-wage 
countries based on their lower level 
of development is a legitimate trade 
advantage that should not be taken 
away. However, where a comparative 
 
‘As the biggest and most 
powerful trading blocs on the 
planet, the US and EU are in 
a position to lead the world 
in promoting the highest 
standards and practices’ 
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ers’ representatives, safe and 
healthy jobs, advance notice of 
workplace closures and efforts to 
mitigate their effects, refrain from 
outsourcing threats in contract 
negotiations, and other good faith 
measures in labor relations;
• are committed to the ‘Uni-
versal Declaration of Human 
Rights’, which calls upon states 
to safeguard the right to form 
and join trade unions, just and 
favourable conditions of work, 
nondiscrimination at work, 
an adequate standard of liv-
ing, medical care, and other 
means of social protection. 
8. Defining Social Rights 
and Standards
With these commitments in mind, 
transatlantic norms of labor rights 
and labor standards should begin 
with a basic principle: No country 
and no multinational firm shall 
violate workers’ rights or reduce 
labor standards to gain competitive 
advantage. Instead, they should 
compete on the high road with better 
education, better job training, better 
use of technology, better planning, 
better organization of work, better 
marketing, better research and devel-
opment, better accounting systems, 
better corporate governance, better 
industrial relations, better productiv-
ity – in short, better management 
and better policies, not on a low road 
with more exploitation of workers.
Transatlantic labor rights and 
standards should include:
• The rights affirmed in ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98, 
should be maintained, and col-
lective bargaining should serve 
as the basis for any changes. 
7. Building on Existing 
Social Commitments
In multiple instruments and forums, 
the US and the EU have already 
adopted principles reflecting a strong 
social dimension. Explicitly building 
them into the transatlantic economic 
relationship does not require new 
commitments or big new institu-
tions. It does, however, call for an 
explicit restatement of such commit-
ments and the creation of a small, 
focused institutional mechanism to 
ensure that commitments are met.
The US and EU member states: 
• are committed under ILO Con-
ventions 87 and 98 to protect 
freedom of association, the 
right to organize, and the right 
to collective bargaining;34 
• are committed to the ILO’s 1998 
‘Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work’ 
setting out freedom of association 
and the right to collective bar-
gaining, no forced labor, no child 
labor, and no discrimination 
in the workplace as basic labor 
protections as well as to the ILO’s 
2001 Resolution and Conclu-
sions concerning social security;
• are committed to the OECD’s 
‘Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’ and its Chapter IV 
on industrial relations, under 
which companies must honor 
ILO core labor standards and, 
beyond them, provide information 
and consultation with work-
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• Information and consultation 
with workers’ representatives, 
in particular when decisions will 
affect jobs and working conditions
• Where workplace closures or 
redundancies are unavoid-
able: advance notice, good faith 
bargaining on a social plan to 
mitigate effects, adequate sev-
erance pay and maintenance 
of social security benefits
9. New Institutional 
Mechanisms
The TEC should create new insti-
tutional mechanisms to implement 
a social dimension in transatlantic 
trade and investment, including:
• A comprehensive code of conduct 
for firms involved in transat-
lantic trade and investment 
incorporating the principles 
outlined in this report;
• Addition of the EU Commissioner 
for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion as well as the US 
Labor Department’s director of 
the International Labor Affairs 
Bureau (ILAB) and the US State 
Department’s Assistant Secretary 
for Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor (DRL) to the TEC 
• The reestablishment of the 
TALD and the provision of 
a dedicated secretariat to: 
° review and evaluate 
multinational company man-
agement’s internal systems 
of due diligence, commu-
nication and control of the 
firm’s social performance
° conduct an annual Labor Infor-
mation Audit on the state of 
labor rights and labor standards 
and effective protection of 
those rights, including:
° respect for, and non-
interference with, workers’ 
organizing efforts
° good faith collective bargaining
° union representatives’ access 
to the workplace (with due 
regard for operations)
° no use of permanent replace-
ments against workers who 
exercise the right to strike
° no threats of adverse conse-
quences or promise of reward 
to influence workers’ exer-
cise of trade union rights
• No child labor, no forced 
labor, and no discrimina-
tion in the workplace
• Healthy and safe conditions 
for workers in the workplace 
and for communities in which 
workplaces are located
• The principles affirmed in the ILO 
2001 Resolution and Conclusions 
concerning social security, encom-
passing decent work and social 
protection systems that safeguard 
the social security rights of the 
workers (e.g. unemployment, 
disability, disease, old age, etc.)
• Equal rights and protec-
tion for migrant workers
• Equality of men and women 
workers, in particular equal 
pay (and other forms of remu-
neration) for equal work and 
for work of equal value
• Wages (and other forms of 
remuneration) equal to or bet-
ter than prevailing standards 
in the industry/region
• Social protection systems and 
standards that safeguard workers 
affected by unemployment, dis-
ability, and in their retirement
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resentatives of the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), the 
American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions (AFL-CIO), the Change to 
Win federation, other trade union 
representatives designated by 
labor organizations, representa-
tives of European and American 
employer associations, academ-
ics, and NGO representatives;
• A complaint-handling proc-
ess marked by responsiveness 
and transparency, with such 
mechanisms as public hearings, 
on-the-ground fact finding mis-
sions, consultation with all relevant 
parties including community 
organizations and NGOs with 
interest in the events complained of; 
• Clear and binding time frames 
for complaints to be considered, 
investigated and resolved;
• Ability of the secretariat to engage 
outside mediators, conciliators 
or arbitrators to help resolve 
disputes before reaching a point 
where the secretariat would make 
a conclusive finding of violations;
• Close cooperation of the secretar-
iat with political institutions such 
as Congress, the European Parlia-
ment and the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC) to 
draw attention to social issues 
and link into existing complaints 
mechanisms and procedures;
• Sufficient funding for the secretar-
iat to fully discharge its mandate.
in firms involved in transat-
lantic trade and investment 
(noting, for example, whether 
firms have been found in viola-
tion of national labor laws or 
international labor standards)
° collaborate with the ILO to 
advance the Decent Work 
Agenda, finding ways for 
the TEC to ‘lead by example’ 
in fostering decent work in 
the context of transatlantic 
trade and investment
° receive complaints, conduct 
investigations, and issue find-
ings and recommendations on 
alleged violations of the code of 
conduct and its principles, and 
° recommend harmonized GSP 
and other preferential trade 
policies for developing coun-
tries’ exports to the US and EU 
to ensure that ILO core labor 
standards and other interna-
tional human rights norms are 
respected in those countries.
• A multiparty advisory committee 
for the secretariat, including rep-
 
‘The transatlantic relationship is 
the most advanced interregional 
connection and therefore an 
important role model. It must 
not be allowed to fail’ 
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10. Conclusion
This report has outlined the strate-
gic importance of the transatlantic 
economic partnership, sought to 
explain its deficiencies and made 
a series of recommendations for 
how to include and operationalize a 
social dimension in TER. Regardless 
of the ongoing rethinking process, 
the transatlantic political agenda is 
still narrowly focused on deregula-
tion matters.35 For the reasons given 
above the continued concentration 
on such issues alone is unlikely to 
create the necessary political owner-
ship to make transatlantic economic 
cooperation more effective and live 
up to its potential and responsibility.
In the absence of capable global 
governance structures – the failure of 
the Copenhagen Summit on climate 
change again underlined these 
problems – interregionalism has an 
important governance role to play 
in an increasingly multipolar world. 
The transatlantic relationship is the 
most advanced interregional con-
nection and therefore an important 
role model. It must not be allowed to 
fail. The thematic and institutional 
widening of the relationship – above 
all by including social issues – is the 
key to prevent this from happening.
The social polity and institu-
tional innovations proposed in 
this report were developed with 
a view to industrial relations and 
workplace issues. The underly-
ing principles of these proposals, 
however, could also be applied to 
other underrepresented policy areas 
such as environmental issues. 
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